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Government business shall be conducted in a manner above reproach and … with
complete impartiality and with preferential treatment for none. Transactions
relating to the expenditure of public funds require the highest degree of public trust
and an impeccable standard of conduct.1

Chairwoman Maloney, Ranking Member Comer, and Members of the Committee, thank you for
inviting me to testify in this legislative hearing. I am Jessica Tillipman, the Assistant Dean for
Government Procurement Law Studies at The George Washington University Law School. In
addition to leading the Law School’s Government Procurement Law Program, I teach our AntiCorruption & Compliance course, which focuses on anti-corruption, ethics, and compliance
issues in government procurement.
The Interim Majority Staff Report, “The Firm and the FDA: McKinsey & Company’s Conflicts
of Interest at the Heart of the Opioid Epidemic” (hereinafter “Conflicts Report”)2 provides a
compelling case study in how conflicts and compliance issues significantly undermine the

FAR 3.101-2.
“The Firm and the FDA: McKinsey & Company’s Conflicts of Interest at the Heart of the Opioid
Epidemic,” Interim Majority Staff Report, Committee on Oversight and Reform, U.S. House of
Representatives (April 13, 2022), available at
https://oversight.house.gov/sites/democrats.oversight.house.gov/files/2022-0413.McKinsey%20Opioid%20Conflicts%20Majority%20Staff%20Report%20FINAL.pdf.
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public’s confidence in our procurement system and the contractors that provide the U.S.
government with critical goods and services.
I will address only two issues raised in the Report: (1) the longstanding need to update and
clarify the current legal framework governing Organizational Conflicts of Interest (OCIs), and
(2) the importance of government contractors maintaining strong internal ethics and compliance
programs. Before addressing these issues, I offer some historical and legal context.
The U.S. government procurement system aspires to obtain the best goods and services, from the
best private sector firms, at the best prices. 3 To attain these goals and ensure that taxpayer dollars
are appropriately safeguarded, the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) 4 makes clear that the
government procurement process demands the highest commitment to ethical and unbiased
conduct. To maintain integrity in the system, entities that do business with the government are
subject to a patchwork of requirements, restrictions, and compliance obligations.
In my Anti-Corruption & Compliance course, I refer to this patchwork of rules as the “U.S.
Government Procurement Anti-Corruption Ecosystem” - a framework designed to prevent,
detect, and mitigate corruption risks in the U.S. government procurement system. It includes
principles such as transparency and oversight; critical tools such as whistleblower protections
and debarment; and an expansive toolbox of civil and criminal laws that address a wide range of
inappropriate and unethical business practices. This anti-corruption “ecosystem” is designed to
accomplish four goals: (1) maintain integrity in interactions with government officials, (2)
promote fairness, transparency, and competition, (3) ensure contractors are honest in their
exchanges with the government, and (4) help maintain integrity throughout the supply chain.
The primary concern raised in the Conflicts Report is the potential conflict of interest between
McKinsey’s work for the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and its pharmaceutical
manufacturer clients. The FAR deals with conflicts of interest in two ways: by regulating
Personal Conflicts of Interest (PCIs) 5 and Organizational Conflicts of Interest (OCIs).6 The
information provided in the Conflicts Report relates primarily to OCIs, so my comments today
focus on this complex area of the law.
The Conflicts Report presents two important questions: (1) whether the current OCI framework
adequately addresses potential conflicts between a contractor’s public sector and private sector
See generally Steven L. Schooner, Desiderata: Objectives for a System of Government Contract Law, 11
PUB. PROCUREMENT L. REV. 103 (2002), available at:
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=304620.
4
The Federal Acquisition Regulations System, Title 48 of the U.S. Code of Federal Regulations, provides
a robust set of rules and requirements governing the U.S. Government’s procurement process.
5
See generally FAR 3.11 and FAR 52.203-16.
6
See generally FAR 9.5.
3
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work, and, if not, (2) what legislative changes could help avoid conflicts of this nature in the
future. With respect to the first question, any objective observer with a basic understanding of
the FAR and access to Google would conclude that existing OCI regulations most certainly cover
conflicts between a contractor’s public and private sector work. As to the second question, the
OCI language in the FAR, which has remained largely unchanged since 1984, should be
revisited. As I discuss in greater detail below, it is no longer reflective of modern procurement
practices and the sophisticated body of OCI case law that has developed over the past several
decades.
Organizational Conflicts of Interest
The FAR defines an OCI as occurring when:
because of other activities or relationships with other persons, a person is unable or
potentially unable to render impartial assistance or advice to the government, or the
person’s objectivity in performing the contract work is or might otherwise be
impaired, or a person has an unfair competitive advantage. 7
The term “person” includes companies and other contracting entities.8 The current framework for
analyzing whether an OCI exists derives primarily from FAR Subpart 9.5 and decisional
precedent from the Government Accountability Office (GAO) and the U.S. Court of Federal
Claims (COFC).9
Although OCIs have been regulated since the 1960s, they have garnered increased attention in
recent decades due to, among other things, consolidation in the information technology and
defense industries, and the government’s increased reliance on contractors to provide services
traditionally performed by public servants, “especially where the contractor is tasked with
providing advice to the Government.”10 Experience suggests that OCIs are more likely to occur
in contracts involving certain services, such as management support services and consultant or
other professional services. 11
OCIs are generally separated into three categories:12
FAR 2.101.
Daniel I. Gordon, Organizational Conflicts of Interest: A Growing Integrity Challenge, 35 PUB. CON.
L.J. 25 (Fall 2005).
9
Keith Szeliga, Conflict and Intrigue in Government Contracts: A Guide to Identifying and Mitigating
Organizational Conflicts of Interest, 35 PUB. CONT. L. J. 639 (2006) (citing FAR 2.101).
10
Organizational Conflicts of Interest, 76 Fed. Reg. 23236 (April 26, 2011).
11
FAR 9.502.
12
FAR 9.505; see also Vantage Assocs., Inc. v. United States, 59 Fed. Cl. 1, 10 (2003) (citing Aetna Gov't
Health Plans, Inc., Found. Health Fed. Servs., Inc., B-254397 (July 27, 1995)).
7
8
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1. Impaired objectivity - may arise where a contractor's outside business relationships
create an economic incentive to provide biased advice under a government contract;
2. Biased ground rules - may occur when, as part of its work under one procurement, the
contractor has helped set the procurement’s ground rules, such as writing the statement of
work or developing specifications, for another procurement; and
3. Unequal access to information - may occur when a contractor obtains access to
nonpublic information as part of its contract performance which gives it an advantage in a
later competition for a government contract.
Most relevant today is “impaired objectivity.” “In these cases, the concern is that the contractor’s
ability to render impartial advice could appear to be undermined by its relationship to the
evaluated entity.”13
FAR 9.504 requires a Contracting Officer (CO) to “identify and evaluate potential organizational
conflicts of interest as early in the acquisition process as possible; and avoid, neutralize, or
mitigate significant potential conflicts before contract award.” To fulfill this obligation, CO’s
depend on contractors to disclose, among other things, “any facts that may cause a reasonably
prudent person to question the Contractor’s impartiality because of the appearance or existence
of bias.”14 Agencies generally demand this information through solicitation provisions or
contract clauses which clearly articulate the government’s expectations with regard to the
disclosure of facts and circumstances that would give rise to an actual or potential OCI. 15
Unlike many other provisions in the FAR that ensure compliance through standard solicitation
provisions and contract clauses found in FAR Subpart 52, the FAR contains no mandatory OCI
solicitation provision or contract clause. Instead, agencies have developed their own language.
For example, FDA contracts may contain the following:
The Contractor warrants that, to the best of the Contractor’s knowledge and belief,
there are no relevant facts or circumstances which would give rise to an
organizational conflict of interest, as defined in FAR Subpart 9.5, and that the
Contractor has disclosed all relevant information regarding any actual or potential
conflict. The Contractor agrees it shall make an immediate and full disclosure, in
Szeliga, supra, note 11, at 660.
See, e.g., 48 CFR § 3452.209-70 (requiring, in Department of Education contracts, disclosure of all
such relevant information if such a conflict of interest appears to exist to a reasonable person with
knowledge of the relevant facts or if such a person would question the impartiality of the contractor). See
also 48 C.F.R. 1352.209-74 (U.S. Department of Commerce’s OCI clause).
15
Id. See also Conflicts Report, supra note 2 at 36 (citing OCI language found in FDA contracts).
13
14
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writing, to the Contracting Officer of any potential or actual organizational conflict
of interest or the existence of any facts that may cause a reasonably prudent person
to question the Contractor’s impartiality because of the appearance or existence of
bias or an unfair competitive advantage. 16
Failure To Disclose OCI’s
Failure to disclose the information required by an applicable OCI clause can lead to a multitude
of adverse consequences, including, but not limited to contract termination, prosecution for the
making of false statements (including fines and imprisonment), or suspension or debarment. In
addition, a false OCI certification could also trigger potential liability under the False Claims
Act, resulting in treble damages and penalties. 17 The submission of false claims may also be
prosecuted criminally. 18 Criminal penalties for submitting false claims include imprisonment and
fines.
Given the potentially severe consequences for failure to disclose an actual or potential OCI, most
sophisticated contractors take affirmative steps to identify potential conflicts of interest and, to
the best of their ability, mitigate the conflicts by, for example, developing firewalls, executing
non-disclosure agreements, or shifting work to a neutral, unaffiliated third party. Although FAR
Subpart 9.5 speaks primarily to COs, contractors play a significant role in communicating with
the CO to seek ways in which potential OCIs can be mitigated or avoided. Moreover, “an
effective mitigation plan may enable a contractor to perform engagements for which it otherwise
would not be available.”19 Notably, “impaired objectivity” OCIs are often very difficult to
mitigate, particularly where the conflict permeates nearly every aspect of the government
contract. Moreover, CO’s tend to reject mitigation plans when contractors fail to implement or
monitor compliance with them (i.e., when employees breach firewalls to obtain a competitive
advantage in a procurement20).
The plain language of FAR 9.5 and the relevant GAO precedent make clear that current law
covers scenarios in which a contractor’s other business relationships (including those with
private sector clients), “could create an incentive for a contractor to provide biased advice” under
its government contracts. 21 The policies underlying OCI rules emphasize why preventing and
mitigating conflicts of this nature are so important:
Conflicts Report, supra note 2 at 36.
See generally 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729 – 3733. See also United States ex rel. Ervin & Assocs., Inc. v.
Hamilton Sec. Grp., Inc., 370 F. Supp. 2d 18, 51- 52 (D.D.C. 2005) (“A government contractor’s failure
to disclose an [OCI] constitutes a false claim under the False Claims Act”).
18
See 18 U.S.C. § 287.
19
Szeliga, supra, note 11, at 660.
20
Johnson Controls World Servs., Inc., B-286714.2 (Feb. 13, 2001).
21
Szeliga, supra, note 11, at 660.
16
17
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The failure of a procurement system to address OCIs appropriately can undermine
both its legitimacy and anti-corruption goals and may have other undesirable
effects. . . . OCIs can also reduce the quality and value of the services a government
receives, because organizations with OCIs may have competing loyalties that could
undermine the quality of their advice to the government. Divided loyalties may
include conflicting interests such as maximizing profit versus rendering candid
advice to the government. In circumstances where providing impartial advice may
be against organizational self-interest, the procuring organization faces
performance risk.22
Although these types of issues most frequently arise in the context of a contractor’s work on one
government contract conflicting with its work on another government contract, FAR Subpart 9.5
is not limited to these types of conflicts. Not only is the plain language of FAR 9.5 broad enough
to cover potential conflicts between a contractor’s government and private sector business, FAR
9.508(i) provides an example that explicitly warns contractors away from conflicts of this nature,
stating:
An agency that regulates an industry wishes to develop a system for evaluating and
processing license applications. Contractor X helps develop the system and process
the applications. Contractor X should be prohibited from acting as a consultant to
any of the applicants during its period of performance and for a reasonable period
thereafter.
Moreover, GAO has sustained several bid protests in which a conflict between a contractor’s
government work and its commercial work has created an impermissible “impaired objectivity”
OCI.23 In these situations, an “OCI is most likely to arise where an outside business venture is
related directly to the subject matter of the procurement and structured such that there is a real
economic incentive for biased performance.” 24
In Washington Utility Group, GAO determined that the Department of Energy (DOE) had
properly excluded a contractor from a procurement competition which involved the preparation
and issuance of requests for proposals for renewable energy projects.25 GAO pointed to several
“unavoidable” OCIs created by the business interests of a company’s proposed subcontractor
Michael D. Pangia, Developing an Organizational Conflicts of Interest Framework: The U.S. System as
A Starting Point, 47 PUB. CONT. L.J. 539, 542 (2018).
23
See, e.g., Alion Science and Technology Corp., B-297342, et al., Jan. 9, 2006 (describing the
contractor’s “multiple competing financial interests arising from the manufacturing and marketing of its
products to the U.S. government, to foreign governments, and to commercial customers.”).
24
Szeliga, supra, note 11, at 660.
25
Wash. Utility Group, Comp. Gen. B-266333, Jan. 29, 1996.
22
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which “presented numerous and substantial potentials for providing biased advice to DOE,”
including:
● The subcontractor was working with another firm to develop the type of technology that
would be considered for financial assistance under the DOE program;
● The subcontractor’s relationship with certain organizations that had the potential to be
funded by DOE could have resulted in the subcontractor having “preconceived opinions
regarding certain technologies which could result in biased advice and recommendations
provided DOE under the contract.”; and
● The subcontractor was negotiating an agreement to assist utility companies to identify
commercial renewable energy opportunities which had “great potential" to influence the
advice provided to DOE.
Moreover, GAO highlighted concerns that the subcontractor’s commercial clientele could
“benefit from inadvertently obtaining information about the types of projects that DOE would
fund.”26 Under these circumstances, GAO found the CO properly concluded that there were “no
realistic means to avoid the conflicts identified” where the contractor would be providing advice
on several technologies in which its subcontractor had a business interest or may have developed
an interest due to its commercial activities.27
Given the wide range of scenarios that may raise concerns about the presence of an unmitigated
OCI, the FAR clarifies that the situations and examples in FAR 9.505 and 9.508 are not “all
inclusive,” and that conflicts may arise in situations not expressly covered. 28 To help entities
determine whether their business activities may implicate these provisions, the FAR emphasizes
that the regulations’ “underlying principles” should be instructive in determining whether a
“significant potential conflict exists,” including “preventing the existence of conflicting roles that
might bias a contractor’s judgment.”29
The FAR’s prescriptive warnings are buttressed by the language found in many agency OCI
solicitation provisions and contract clauses, which, for example, not only require contractors to
identify actual OCIs, but apparent OCIs as well.30 Moreover, these clauses typically also require
the immediate disclosure of “the existence of any facts that may cause a reasonably prudent

Id.
Id.
28
See generally FAR 9.505, 9.508.
29
FAR 9.505.
30
Conflicts Report, supra note 2 at 36 (citing OCI language found in one of McKinsey’s contracts with
the FDA).
26
27
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person to question the contractor's impartiality because of the appearance or existence of bias . .
.”31
Although the current version of the FAR certainly covers situations involving conflicts between
an entity’s government and private sector work, it is no longer reflective of modern procurement
practices and OCI case law that has developed over the past several decades. As addressed in
greater detail below, the most recent attempt to overhaul the FAR’s OCI regulations in 2011
ultimately failed.32 The proposed rule would have refined the current regulations and
standardized OCI solicitation provisions and contract clauses. Moreover, it also proposed
strengthening safeguards with respect to the nonpublic information contractors access during the
performance of their government contracts. The Conflicts Report reminds us that it is past time
to revisit this initiative.
The Importance of Contractor Ethics & Compliance Programs
All of the issues highlighted in the Conflicts Report must be considered against the backdrop of a
growing global consensus on what constitutes an effective corporate ethics and compliance
program. Since the mid-aughts, there has been increased attention given to the importance of
internal compliance and ethics programs designed to prevent, detect, and mitigate ethics and
corruption risks that may develop in the course of a company’s business activities.33 Given the
heightened corruption risks and compliance obligations associated with government contracts,
most sophisticated government contractors have invested heavily in ethics and compliance
programs to reduce these risks.
Recognizing the increased role of ethics and compliance programs in entities that do business
with the U.S. government, FAR 52.203-13 requires contractors 34 to (1) adopt a written code of
business ethics and conduct which must be made available to each employee engaged in
performance of the contract, (2) maintain an ongoing business ethics awareness and compliance
program, and (3) develop an internal control system. FAR 52.203-13 provides contractors with
additional details about what an effective compliance program and internal control system should
entail, including, among other things, training, procedures designed to ensure timely discovery of
improper conduct in connection with Government contracts; and “periodic reviews of business
practices, procedures, policies, and internal controls for compliance with the Contractor’s code
Id.
Organizational Conflicts of Interest, 86 Fed. Reg. 14863 (March 19, 2021).
33
See generally Jessica Tillipman & Vijaya Surampudi, The Compliance Mentorship Program:
Improving Ethics and Compliance in Small Government Contractors, 49 PUB. CONT. L.J. 217 (2020)
(describing an evolving global effort to encourage companies to dedicate resources to developing anticorruption compliance programs and maintaining robust internal controls).
34
The FAR exempts small business concerns and contracts for the acquisition of a commercial product or
commercial service from this requirement. FAR 52.203-13(c).
31
32
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of business ethics and conduct and the special requirements of Government contracting.” Even
for contractors that fall outside the coverage of this FAR provision, implementing and
maintaining a strong ethics and compliance program remains a necessity given its key role in
reducing risk, ensuring compliance with the law, and sustaining a culture that promotes ethical
conduct.
Many of the world’s largest government contractors have dedicated significant resources to
“promote and advance a culture of ethical conduct in every company that provides products and
services through government contracting.”35 Recognizing that ethical transgression by one
government contractor has the potential to negatively impact all government contractors,
organizations such as the Defense Industry Initiative (DII)36 and the International Forum for
Business Ethical Conduct (IFBEC) 37 are dedicated to establishing and improving business ethics
and compliance programs in the government contracts industry. The efforts of DII and IFBEC
are buttressed by organizations such as the Society of Corporate Compliance and Ethics
(SCCE),38 which provide support to ethics and compliance professionals across all industries.
Contractors must develop policies and procedures tailored to the unique risks they face. A truly
“risk-tailored” compliance program recognizes that not all risks are equal and appreciates that
devoting more time to policing high-risk areas is an essential component of an effective
compliance program. For example, given the risks associated with a contractor’s failure to
properly identify, mitigate, and disclose potential OCIs, most contractors have dedicated
compliance policies, procedures, and controls designed to effectively manage this risk. 39
Moreover, in light of the heightened OCI risks associated with contracts involving management
support and consulting services, contractors providing services of this nature would be expected
to dedicate a greater proportion of their compliance resources to this particular aspect of their
compliance program.
A robust and proactive approach to OCI compliance would likely include:
● Clear and accessible policies and procedures designed to identify OCI risks and
requirements;
Defense Industry Initiative, “About DII,” at https://www.dii.org/about/aboutdii#:~:text=The%20DII%20is%20nonpartisan%20and,and%20services%20through%20government%20c
ontracting.
36
Defense Industry Initiative, at https://www.dii.org/home.
37
International Forum on Business Ethical Conduct for the Aerospace and Defense Industry, at
https://ifbec.info/.
38
Society of Corporate Compliance and Ethics, at https://www.corporatecompliance.org/.
39
For example, the Conflicts Report links to a copy of McKinsey’s “Organizational Conflicts of Interest
Policy,” which is designed to assist employees with identifying, assessing, and potentially disclosing
OCIs in the context of the company’s federal government contracts work.
35
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● Processes and internal controls designed to ensure actual practices are compliant and
consistent with internal policies and regulatory/contractual requirements;
● A regular testing protocol to assess the effectiveness of internal controls related to OCI
compliance;
● Remediation of any identified weaknesses in policies, procedures, or practices;
● Firm-wide training of employees on OCI requirements, with more extensive training for
employees most likely to encounter or manage OCI-related issues;
● Ensuring senior management’s words and actions demonstrate a commitment to OCI
compliance;
● Requiring and encouraging employees to identify and report facts that could give rise to a
potential OCI;
● Conducting a rigorous OCI analysis before submitting any proposals to the government
and fully complying with any OCI reporting obligations; and
● Maintaining stringent controls relating to the safeguarding of nonpublic information
acquired or accessed during the performance of a government contract.
Merely adopting an OCI policy is not enough. The effectiveness of an institution’s ethics and
compliance program depends upon whether it is followed in practice. An official “policy” that
appears strong and protective is virtually meaningless if ignored. Ethics and compliance
professionals disparage “paper programs”— compliance policies and procedures that appear
robust but are neither implemented nor followed in practice. In its “Evaluation of Corporate
Compliance Programs” guidance, the Department of Justice (DOJ) has identified three
“fundamental questions” for evaluating the effectiveness of a compliance program:
1. Is the compliance program well designed?
2. Is the program being applied earnestly and in good faith? In other words, is the program
adequately resourced and empowered to function effectively?
3. Does the compliance program work in practice?40

See generally U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., CRIM. DIV., EVALUATION OF CORPORATE COMPLIANCE
PROGRAMS (2020), available at https://www.justice.gov/criminal-fraud/page/file/937501/download.
40
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To be clear, an occasional violation or deviation from policies and procedures does not
necessarily mean that a compliance program is ineffective, as no entity is immune from human
transgression. However, evidence of a systemic disregard for compliance policies and
procedures, particularly when committed by senior leaders, is often strong evidence of a weak
culture of compliance.
The Path Forward
A 2007 Report of the Acquisition Advisory Panel to the Office of Federal Procurement Policy
and the United States Congress noted:
[T]he trend toward more reliance on contractors . . . raises the possibility that the
government’s decision-making processes can be undermined. . . . [u]nless the
contractor employees performing these tasks are focused upon the interests of the
United States, as opposed to their personal interests or those of the contractor who
employs them, there is a risk that inappropriate decisions will be made. 41
Despite widespread acknowledgment that increased reliance on contractors could create fertile
ground for conflicts of interest, government regulation of these potential hazards has not kept
pace. Over a decade ago, various government audits and studies identified significant issues
stemming from the government’s increased reliance on contractors to provide services
traditionally performed by public servants.42 Although progress has been made, 43 some issues
persist.
The current framework governing OCIs and contractor access to nonpublic information are
outdated, inconsistent with modern procurement practices, and fail to address the growing risks
associated with the government’s increasing reliance on contractors to provide services which
include advice and the exercise of judgment.
REPORT OF THE ACQUISITION ADVISORY PANEL TO THE OFFICE OF FEDERAL PROCUREMENT POLICY
AND THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS (Jan. 2007), available at
41

https://www.acquisition.gov/sites/default/files/page_file_uploads/ACQUISITION-ADVISORY-PANEL2007-Report_final.pdf.
42
See, e.g., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-10-693, STRONGER SAFEGUARDS NEEDED FOR
CONTRACTOR ACCESS TO SENSITIVE INFORMATION 30 (2010) (recommending more thorough
protections when contractors are allowed access to sensitive information); ADMIN. CONF. OF THE U.S.,
2011-3, COMPLIANCE STANDARDS FOR GOVERNMENT CONTRACTOR EMPLOYEES – PERSONAL
CONFLICTS OF INTEREST AND USE OF CERTAIN NON-PUBLIC INFORMATION, 76 Fed. Reg. 48792 (Aug.
9, 2011) (discussing a proposed rule addressing PCIs and recommending model language in the FAR to
be used in contracts that pose particular risks of government contractor employee personal conflicts of
interest or misuse of nonpublic information).
43
On November 2, 2011, the FAR Council issued a final rule, creating FAR Subpart 3.11, titled
“Preventing Personal Conflicts of Interest for Contractor Employees Performing Acquisition Functions,”
and a new contract clause at FAR 52.203-16, titled “Preventing Personal Conflicts of Interest.”
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In 2011, the FAR Council44 engaged in a thoughtful and somewhat Herculean task of attempting
to refine OCI rules to make the regulation more reflective of modern procurement practices and
the sophisticated body of OCI case law that has developed over the past several decades.
Although the proposed rule was never implemented and ultimately withdrawn (ten years later, on
March 19, 2021),45 the proposed rule addressed numerous outstanding issues, including:
● Relocating the FAR’s OCI Provisions: After concluding that OCI issues are more
closely aligned with “business practice” issues than contractor qualifications, the
proposed rule recommended relocating the FAR’s OCI provisions from FAR 9.5 to a new
FAR Subpart 3.12.
● Amending Existing FAR Coverage and Introducing New Solicitation Provisions and
Contract Clauses: Recognizing the need to assist contracting officers in implementing
the Government’s OCI policy, the FAR Council recommended amending existing FAR
coverage to clarify key terms and provide more detailed guidance regarding how
contracting officers should identify and address OCIs. It also introduced new solicitation
provisions and contract clauses after determining that it would be beneficial to have
standard language in the FAR that could be tailored if appropriate (rather than relying on
agency-specific solicitation provisions and contract clauses).
● Enhancing Protections Related to Contractor Access of Nonpublic Information:
Citing to government reports that raised concerns regarding the safeguarding of
nonpublic information contractors may obtain while performing government contracts,
the FAR Council proposed new FAR clauses which would contractually obligate
contractors to protect all nonpublic information to which they obtain access by means of
contract performance. The FAR Council also proposed requiring all employees who may
access nonpublic information to sign nondisclosure agreements and that the obligations
arising from these agreements will be enforceable by both the Government and thirdparty information owners.
The Conflicts Report once again reminds us that we need to revisit this effort – not only to bring
greater clarity to the existing regulations, but to create a more uniform approach across federal
agencies when it comes to addressing the risks associated with OCIs and the protection of
nonpublic information.
Some suggest that the concerns that led to the 2011 rule have since subsided. Yet this highprofile incident reminds us that there is still much room for improvement in the current rules.
The FAR Council membership consists of the Administrator for Federal Procurement Policy, the
Secretary of Defense, the Administrator of National Aeronautics and Space, and the Administrator of
General Services. See https://www.acquisition.gov/far-council-members.
45
Organizational Conflicts of Interest, 86 Fed. Reg. 14863 (March 19, 2021).
44
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Indeed, one need only look at the evolution of many of the procurement systems' most important
anti-corruption laws to see how this is true:
● After discovering widespread fraud committed by contractors during the Civil War,
Congress enacted the False Claims Act.
● In the wake of the Watergate scandal, Congress passed numerous important ethics and
anti-corruption laws, including the Ethics in Government Act and Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act.
● After a major multi-agency investigation nicknamed “Operation Ill Wind” uncovered a
widespread scheme in which contractors and consultants obtained confidential bid and
proposal information related to Department of Defense procurements in exchange for
bribes, Congress enacted the Procurement Integrity Act.
● After one of the most senior acquisition officials in the Air Force, Darlene Druyun,
admitted to illegally favoring Boeing Company on a number of Air Force contracts
because of, among other things, her employment negotiations with the company, the
importance of maintaining integrity during employment negotiations became more
prominent in industry ethics guidance and trainings.
● The revelation that Leonard Glenn Francis (“Fat Leonard”) had bribed a large number of
Navy officials in exchange for, among other things, classified ship schedules and
confidential procurement information, it forced the Navy and other government agencies
to assess the quality of their own ethics and compliance processes.
In each of these cases, it took high-profile scandals to spur legislative action and increased
attention to the importance of ethics and integrity in the government procurement system. The
laws and compliance enhancements resulting from these incidents and others form the backbone
of our modern-day government procurement anti-corruption ecosystem – shaping the way
government officials and contractors are expected to conduct themselves in the United States and
abroad.
Unlike headline-generating topics such as bribery and fraud, OCIs are often viewed as a highly
technical litigation issue that rarely garners attention outside of law firm client advisories. The
Conflicts Report reminds us that OCIs are an integrity issue that have the potential to undermine
the quality and value of the services a government receives. When taxpayer dollars are at stake, a
contractor’s undivided loyalties are paramount. It’s time to revisit the work the FAR Council
began over a decade ago with respect to organizational conflicts of interest and bring greater
awareness and compliance attention to this important issue.
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Thank you for the opportunity to discuss this important matter with you. I would be pleased to
answer any questions.
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